US support package can’t come soon enough

Yesterday at around midday a loud explosion rang out across Dnipro city. Sitting in my flat, my heart sank somewhat, given the train station had been hit just the day before, killing three civilians. As I moved away from the window towards the bathroom, I could see the plume of smoke rising up from towards Dnipro airport- the same airport I used to fly to and from regularly prior to 2022. 

The sirens sounded up. I’m not sure whether they’d been activated prior to the strike, but if they were, we’re talking seconds, not minutes.  

Subsequent scouring of Russian propaganda channels eventually showed the strike in detail. What appears to be a lone Ukrainian MiG-29 sitting on the tarmac is filmed from the sky with a maintenance crew working around it.  A powerful explosion metres away leaves the plane in flames and the fate of the ground crew unknown. The same channel claims Russian forces have destroyed four MiG-29s in the last 3 days alone, as well as an S-300 air defence system, also in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. 

Ukraine doesn’t have many planes to lose, so losing another, let alone four, is a bitter blow. But yesterday’s strike says something more than just the loss of an aircraft. That the sirens seem to be delivering less and less warning (read Dan Hooton’s blog here) suggests new vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s air defence; perhaps new weapons on the Russian side, perhaps loss of radar systems on the Ukrainian side, perhaps both. But no longer are missiles being intercepted with the same success as 6 months ago.  

Ukrainian MiG-29 targeted at Dnipro Airport 

Even more tellingly, that the strike was filmed so clearly from above demonstrates that Russian ISTAR* assets are now able to penetrate Ukrainian territory with virtual impunity. (Connected or not, at least one damaged Patriot system was photographed being shipped to the US this week).  The release of footage of the strike into the public domain suggests Russia isn’t even playing that card close to its chest: the propaganda capital is worth more than the perceived risk of letting Ukraine know its new capabilities. Indeed, the Rybar Telegram channel was quick to gloat about getting UAVs over Dnipro, up to 120km from Russian lines- “a new record”. 

The issue of Russia’s creeping frontier of air superiority is not limited to Dnipro. We released a Spot Report earlier this week about what this means for Kharkiv currently, and implications for the Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts, too.  

It is clear then, that the US House’s approval last night of the $61bn aid package is crucial, particularly for air defence, as is Europe’s pledge this week of up to seven Patriot systems. Long range surface- surface missiles, such as ATACMS, will also play a role, pushing Russian air bases further to the rear and potentially making Russian jets more vulnerable as they are forced to spend longer in the air. While Storm Shadows/SCALP are capable, they require air launching and Ukraine doesn’t have many planes left, much less to lose. Meanwhile, Germany is still hesitating to hand over its Taurus system. The impact (and indeed the delivery!) of F-16s is yet to be seen. Either way, given the darkening skies over Dnipro, Kharkiv and elsewhere in Ukraine over the past few weeks, it’s clear that this aid package may only just be in the nick of time. 

A damaged Patriot system being delivered to the US

*Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

Spearfish Ukraine roll out HEAT Training in Dinipro

Earlier this month Spearfish Ukraine delivered its inaugural HEAT course just outside of Dnipro

Earlier this month Spearfish Ukraine delivered its inaugural HEAT course just outside of Dnipro. We were pleased to see weeks of hard work pay off and watch the course unfold as planned. And while it was satisfying to see our students take away valuable learning, we ourselves left with an important lesson.

Our primary objective was to provide 14 years of Spearfish’s experience delivering HEAT and combine it with our instructors’ own knowledge of the Ukrainian context in order to create and deliver market-leading safety training for the humanitarian sector. For example, Yuliia has been a mine action officer locally and worldwide for nearly a decade. Dmytro has delivered and interpreted trauma first aid courses for a range of different organisations and audiences in Ukraine. Matt has spent years as a paramedic in the Donbas, the UK and elsewhere. And Charlie has been on the front line in Ukraine since 2015, formerly as an OSCE observer in Donetsk and Mariupol. Together, we were able to design a course that helps the humanitarian sector mitigate the specific threats inherent in Ukraine today.

Our students were from diverse backgrounds themselves. Two were emergency doctors from Dnipro, one driver and one security officer were from international NGOs, one international student was new to Ukraine and one volunteer was from a local NGO. Their own experiences were incredibly valuable to the course, whether that be attending multiple vehicle collisions in a medical capacity, understanding gender-based violence at checkpoints, explaining the language and coordination problems between local and international NGOs or the describing the current threats that face volunteers helping IDPs. Incorporating that knowledge, and that of future students, into the Spearfish Ukraine HEAT course will be critical to remaining current and relevant as we deliver more courses.

Surprisingly, only the one international student from an INGO had attended a HEAT course previously. The principle was actually relatively alien to most of the other students. For the Spearfish Ukraine staff, it was gratifying to see the students appreciate the course content, both in terms of specific lessons and holistically as a course that incorporated practical sessions and scenarios. Some understood “the risk matrix” but had never changed a wheel, while others knew how to “stop the bleed” but hadn’t considered the asbestos threat from damaged buildings. We were very humbled to receive great feedback at the end of the course, knowing that without students’ enthusiastic participation, the course would not have been half as engaging.

That national Ukrainian staff were new to HEAT is unfortunate. National staff across the humanitarian sector are disproportionately represented in casualty statistics. For example, the Aid Worker Security Report 2023 states that of 444 aid worker victims of violence worldwide last year, 421 (95%) were national staff.[1] The pattern is virtually identical for all the years on record. While sobering, that is perhaps not surprising when considering that national staff usually make up the bulk of the humanitarian sector workforce. What is surprising is that they often miss out on the same level of training and resources as their international counterparts, be that HEAT training, PPE provision, insurance packages, healthcare etc. Often, that may be because local NGOs simply lack the resources that large international NGOs command. Yet where those large international NGOs ask national staff to face in-country threats, either through direct employment, contracting or often through partnering, they have a duty to ensure those risks are mitigated for.

Partnerships between large international NGOs and smaller Ukrainian NGOs are critical in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those who need it. They allow funding and expertise to be channelled through people who know the ground, understand the needs, speak the language and have the permanency in-country. Often, national staff working for Ukrainian NGOs are volunteers, working purely on the principle of supporting their communities, or earning little more than a subsistence salary. While they may take risks voluntarily, and are able to stay lean and operational as a result, the budgets that come in from abroad should be deployed to keep them safe in their work, especially when their work is on behalf of international NGOs.

Spearfish Ukraine wants to encourage that duty of care to extend beyond the books of international NGOs to include those local volunteers mentioned in the statistics above. On our recent course, we offered some free places to the smallest NGO’s without funds for such training. As we work with larger clients, we want to develop mechanisms where a similar approach can be incorporated alongside paying attendees. We hope to be part of an industry shift where the safety needs of Ukrainian NGOs are considered in international humanitarian projects’ budgets.

We are excited to see what the future holds for Spearfish Ukraine, but at the same time the tragedy that unfolded shortly after we wrapped up the course reminds us that what we are doing is important for those working day-to-day in field. We would like to extend a thanks to our students for their valuable input and engagement on the course and hope to replicate the success as we begin to scale up our delivery.

[1] Humanitarian Outcomes, Aid Worker Security Report 2023, https://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/AWSR_2023

To learn more about our HEAT Courses in Ukraine please contact rosieturner@spear-fish.com

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Ukraine Politico-Military Situation

Strategic Objectives in the Ukraine Counter-Offensive

Strategic Objectives in the Ukraine Counter-Offensive

Much of the Ukraine analysis in Western media has focused on the state of the counter-offensive. Specifically, analysts have focused on the tactical picture around Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast and Klishiivka in the Donetsk Oblast. Success in Robotyne and breaking through the Russian defensive lines opens the way to Tokmak. Capturing Tokmak would put much of the Russian road and rail routes to Crimea within range of Ukrainian artillery and MLRS systems. In a sense, Ukraine has the opportunity to cut the “land bridge” to Crimea without physically holding the ground. The arrival of the American ATACMS will be pivotal in this regard. Klishiivka on the other hand provides the high ground necessary to take and hold Bakhmut further north in the future. Again, the recent arrival of American cluster munitions are already said to be helping take a toll on Russian trench positions here. In re-capturing Bakhmut, Ukraine is able to demonstrate its will to fight to Western backers and deal a blow to morale to the Russian forces that spilt so much blood in taking it.

Ukraine's Resilience Amid Slow Progress

That we are talking about small, specific towns, and that we have been talking about the same small towns for weeks, indicates the slow progress of the counter-offensive. The Kharkiv counter-offensive in 2022 gained so much ground in so little time that analysis spoke of cities and oblasts, not villages and tree-lines. Analysis today is also right to note the time constraints on Ukrainian forces: the approaching autumn and the American elections next year. It is difficult to imagine large successes in the counter-offensive with the time available.

Here it is important to note the Ukrainian will to fight. Zelensky has repeatedly ruled out negotiations while Russian forces remain on Ukrainian territory and while Putin is in power, and this position appears resolute. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian population seems ready for the long-haul. There is an acceptance of the situation, and with little complaint, perseverance. It is visible day-to-day. Institutions are functioning, the trains run on time, business are open, people walk in the parks in the evenings and weekends. The sirens still sound but are tolerated, in much the same way that people came to tolerate coronavirus three years previously. People continue to talk of the pending victory and curse the Russians in the same breath. The calls for negotiations are from abroad, not from Ukraine.

The Challenge of Sustaining Ukraine's Counter-Offensive

And so the question is inevitably raised: can Ukraine succeed in its counter-offensive before Western support dwindles? What is missing from analysis, however, is not the tactical picture on the ground, nor the state of Western support. It is the political picture in Russia.

It is easy for us to watch a few battlefield videos or hear a few anecdotes about the poor state of the Russian army, and make the conclusion that Russia does not have the military prowess it claimed in the run-up to the invasion. But for all its tactical failures, Russia still has the vast materiel resources and manpower to continue fighting 18 months on against an opponent supported militarily, diplomatically and financially by most of the world’s largest economies. As this realisation dawns, along with the growing consensus that the war will continue for years rather than months, it is natural to worry that critical voices will grow louder, from Viktor Orban to Tucker Carlson.

Russia's Brittle Political Landscape and Growing Discontent: Insights and Implications

But while the Russian state may not be fragile, it is brittle. Some may point to the iron grip Putin appears to have over Russia’s institutions, politics and society and compare it to the comparative weakness of Western leaders. Britain went through three Prime Ministers in two months last year, for example, while Putin has been in power for over 20 years. But the reality is that the Russian political system has no room for flex. When change comes, it comes hard and fast, as seen multiple times over the last century plus. Where in the West, the party may change but the political mechanisms endure, in Russia the upheaval is full political revolution- the kind not seen in Britain since Oliver Cromwell. The Wagner debacle, while perhaps not the change we want, was a small glimpse at the kind of “black swan” event in the future that we cannot foresee today.

The Ukrainian criticism of the Russian citizenry is that they lack the initiative, conviction or motivation seen on Maidan in 2013-14. That is fair. State persecution of political opposition is harsh, but Russians who oppose the war have so far been more likely to take a flight to the Red Sea than organise an uprising on the Red Square.

Yet while it is hard to measure, discontent in Russia is rising. Younger citizens, particularly those with access to online media as opposed the state television, question where their country is headed, and why they are today politically closer to North Korea than Berlin or Paris. They are also not blind to the irony of “standing up to the West” but at the same time selling sovereignty in Siberia to China. Reminders of Russia’s isolation are everywhere: the loss of international clients in the lucrative IT sphere, the absence of Western high street brands, the loss of direct flights to Europe and new visa restrictions on Russian citizens. The list goes on. But while that may not be enough to spark a political upheaval, it certainly acts as a substantial supply of fuel once ignition is reached. That this “enlightened” liberal citizenry is located primarily in Moscow and St Petersburg will likely play its part.

Conclusion

So, while it is not wrong to put Ukraine’s counter-offensive against a Westen timetable of elections and changing seasons, it should not be done without considering the picture in Russia too. Discussion around whether Ukraine can indeed reach the Azov Sea militarily may turn out to be a moot point, should an upheaval in Russia precipitate. Analysis should therefore consider whether Western support can enable Ukraine to sustain itself long enough not to reach the American election, but to hold out for a Russian political collapse.

HEAT & Duty of Care in Ukraine

HEAT & Duty of care in UKraine

Hostile Environment Awareness Training, or HEAT, has been a regular product of the security consultancy industry for years. It helps students navigate potentially hostile circumstances by teaching theory in the classroom, embedding that theory through exercise, and facilitating its recall through simulating stressful scenarios.

HEAT - an overview

HEAT is borne through organisations’ concept of duty of care to their staff. It is not enough for organisations to send their staff into difficult situations with only a notepad, pen and insurance package. Responsible organisations provide their staff and partners with all the tools available to navigate, negotiate and negate the threats their organisation is pitting them against.

Among HEAT providers, British outfits are often well represented. That is partly because of Britain’s institutional knowledge of operating abroad, both in the conflict and post-conflict space, and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is also partly due to the UK’s large overseas aid budget and the global reach of projects borne from it, and to Britain’s well-developed media industry. But it is also because of Britain’s duty of care culture (and legal system), where organisations are expected to protect their employees, and risk owners and risk managers are well-defined. HEAT providers local to the theatre are often therefore lacking, not because local skills and experience are absent, but because they have not been called upon from a duty of care perspective.

Broadly, HEAT has been focused on theatres in the Global South, and in particular Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA and Southern Asia. Spearfish is no exception; it’s where the market has been. Ukraine differs in most respects. It is not post-conflict for one thing. It does not struggle with managing infrastructure; just compare Nova Poshta with Royal Mail. It is not overrun with non-state actors; the oligarchy prefers the shadows to the streets. Yet, Ukraine is at war, and war is very much a hostile environment, even if the specific threats and the cultural context are different.

Adapting HEAT Training for Unique Challenges in Ukraine

One of the most pertinent examples of how Ukraine’s specifics affects HEAT is the discussion around the kidnap threat. Kidnap has been a staple of HEAT courses for years, not only because it has been a serious threat in other theatres, but because it offers the prospect of immersive scenarios on HEAT courses. Plenty of HEAT students will recall in the past being “ambushed”, bagged and cuffed and subsequently held in stress positions during mock interrogations. But most people operating in Ukraine are almost certainly never going to be exposed to that kind of threat. The non-state groups that use kidnap do not enjoy in Ukraine the vacuums of power that are needed, and the kidnap threat from the Russian military is overshadowed by the threats involved reaching that scenario.

Yet at the same time, the loss of one’s freedom of movement is still perfectly feasible in Ukraine. Through having the wrong documents at a checkpoint, an exotic stamp in one’s passport, a miscommunication in the field, detention is a threat and while it may not have the same level of impact as in other theatres, it may still lead to project delays or loss of equipment, and has done for many already.

The environmental threat is also somewhat unique. Gone is the earthquake and hurricane threat, but instead flooding from breeched dam in Kakhovka and fears of nuclear meltdown in Energodar (possibly the strangest city in Ukraine, anyone who’s seen the film “S Lurkhim Parom I Ironia Sudby” will know why). As for street crime, you’d be better off in Lutsk than London, yet the same would not be said for fraud and financial crime. The list goes on. And on.

The challenge for HEAT providers is the integration of these nuances into tried and tested formats, without them just being an after-thought. “Baking in” as opposed to “sprinkling on top”. Not least because plenty of students will be Ukrainian themselves and will be able to call out contextual ignorance a mile off (hence Spearfish’s efforts to localise its HEAT through its Ukrainian instructors).

Another challenge is the political context. Ukraine is fighting a war against an aggressor, and most foreigners are in country to support Ukraine in some capacity. But how do we separate our own sentiments and loyalties from the principles of some very important organisations that many of us work either for or with (objectivity, non-alignment, non-interference)? How do we address some of the threats in country without appearing culturally critical (alcoholism, corruption)? And how do we deal with situations where our own advice conflicts with that of our host or deploying governments?

Conclusion

Ukraine, then, offers a unique challenge to HEAT providers, and an “off the shelf” course doesn’t cut it. We should rise to that challenge, both in order to prepare our students for the plethora of threats they face in the field and to help client organisations fulfil their duty of care to staff. In turn, the knock-on effects are positive.

First, as a security consultancy industry, we can improve our own institutional knowledge of hostile environments, in particular through listening to the experiences of our students who are usually the ones at the coal face. This can then be fed back into subsequent courses not only in Ukraine but beyond.

Second (and more importantly), one would hope that the duty of care culture we are familiar with spreads. Many international NGOs still outsource their projects to local partners, sometimes specifically in order to avoid duty of care obligations to those working in the most dangerous locations. That should change, and large NGOs with big budgets should extend their duty of care to their local partners, in part by providing them with HEAT. Amongst all the suffering in Ukraine today, this remains an opportunity for positive change.

Why Prigozhin’s last minute fold might be the best possible outcome for Ukraine

Observers of the war in Ukraine woke on Saturday morning to the news of an armed mutiny by the Wagner PMC. Rostov-on-Don had been seized and the military HQ of the Russian Southern Command captured without a shot being fired. Prigozhin, filmed inside the HQ speaking to Russia’s deputy Defence Minister and deputy Chief of the General Staff surrounded by armed Wagnerites, demanded talks with Shoigu and Gerasimov. When that was denied to Prigozhin, he began his “march for justice” towards Moscow, taking Voronezh and allegedly shooting down up to seven aircraft along the way.

The news was well received in Ukraine and beyond. The irony of “Kyiv in three days” but Rostov in three hours was lost on no-one. While Wagner has been an enemy to Ukraine in Bakhmut and beyond, it was hard for many not to feel a little glee as they moved towards Moscow. For a whole excited day, most people were checking their phones for news of their progress.

And then, just as the heavens opened here last night in Dnipro, it was all over. Prigozhin had struck a deal through Belorussian president Lukashenko to accept exile in Belarus and call off the mutiny. It’s still unclear what the exact terms of the agreement were, nor why Prigozhin climbed down so quickly, but it seems likely he had been counting on more support amongst Russia’s armed forces and the Moscow political elite, which did not precipitate in the event. So much for “25,000 of us ready to die”.

It’s easy to be disappointed. The speed at which it was all over meant Ukraine was not afforded the battlefield advantage for its counter-offensive it would have received in a more drawn-out confrontation. There was also not enough time for Russian political opponents to the war to mobilise, nor for citizens to use a window of opportunity to take to the streets. The potential for this is currently underestimated. 

Yet Putin is weak. He was, of course, already weak, but he is now also exposed. There were little more than eight hours between him publicly declaring that the mutineers would be “punished harshly before the law” and letting Prigozhin fly to Belarus without any charges whatsoever. Of course, what happens to Prigozhin subsequently remains to be seen. But it was an admission by Putin that he doubted his own control over the state to crush the mutiny. The President’s bluff in the morning was called by the afternoon.

Putin’s allies noticed. Uganda’s offer to send military assistance (to the “second army of the world”) will not have been received in Moscow with quite the same enthusiasm in which it was sent.  And that Lukashenko had brokered the deal, a man patronised by Putin to maintain his own power, also speaks to Putin’s failing grasp on control. Those governments still on the fence, such as India and many Middle Eastern states, will be wondering how much longer they can sustain their positions. At some point, they will need to be seen backing the winning side, India and Saudi Arabia in particular. China, of course, will press home any advantage over Putin’s frailty.

Prigozhin also called out the official Russian justification for the war in Ukraine in a video address, that is, that Russia was threatened by a Ukrainian invasion of neo-Nazis and NATO itself. It is unlikely that Progozhin’s video will be seen by the wider Russian audience. Nonetheless, it does detract from the Russian narrative and may well ruffle feathers amongst the Russian oligarchy who already suffer from Western sanctions.

With Prigozhin in Belarus, it will be interesting to see what becomes of the Wagner PMC and its presence in Ukraine. Scenarios range from the conservative (Putin installs a more loyal head) to the more optimistic (the PMC is disbanded altogether). Perhaps most likely is something in between, such as Wagner units being incorporated into the regular Russian armed forces and its African operations allowed to continue. In any case, Wagner’s effectiveness as a fighting force is disrupted to some degree. This no doubt benefits Ukraine on the battlefield. 

That Wagner was not confronted militarily to any meaningful degree in the hours before the Lukashenko deal points to Russian military incompetence, inability or insubordination, or perhaps all three. In Ukraine, the impact of the saga on the regular Russian military will be felt, despite its brevity. First, its ace unit is now compromised operationally and may not rejoin the battlefield. Second, its regular troops in the trenches will have watched an insurgent force capture its headquarters and move over 700km in Russia itself virtually unopposed. Combine that with further scheduled deliveries of Western weapons, including F-16 fighter jets, and it is hard to see Russian morale in anything other than terminal decline.

Yet had Prigozhin continued on his march, Pandora’s box might have been less forgiving. A rapid Ukrainian breakthrough in the midst of civil war in Russia may well have lowered the threshold for Putin’s willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons, or use the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to the same ends. That’s not to mention Wagner capturing nuclear facilities or weapons in Russia itself as a means of blackmail.

A political upheaval in Moscow would most likely have led to a more radical figure in charge of Russia’s Ukrainian operation. Prigozhin himself is counted amongst many others in Moscow who have called for nationwide mobilisation and an all-in approach to the war. The Russian nuclear threshold may well have been found to be much lower than it is today. In the absence of a coherent liberal opposition, the idea of a rapid Russian shift to liberal democracy is optimistic.

And so, while Ukraine gained little of the immediate battlefield advantage many had hoped to see, it has seen Putin’s Russia severely weakened and exposed at home, on the battlefield and abroad. The Russian strategy of enduring sanctions and waiting for Western resolve to fray has been turned on its head: Ukrainian endurance and continued Western unity has cracked the Russian sledgehammer tangibly. The advantages may be longer term than many would have liked, but they are nonetheless there. At the same time, Prigozhin’s fold avoids some of the more serious risks precipitating. The whole affair, while seemingly over in 24 hours, is perhaps the best possible outcome for Ukraine.